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Despite temporary migration programmes (TMPs) being heralded as achieving a triple 
win – whereby the host state, the sending state and the migrants themselves all benefit 
– the UK government has now terminated all such programmes, including the long-
standing Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS). At the same time, TMPs 
have been heavily criticised by both the academic and policy sectors, as they tie workers 
to employers in rigid ways and lack integration measures. This paper reviews the 
SAWS scheme, including the policy evolution of the programme and the reasons for 
the closure. We argue that the government is inflicting a multiple loss scenario, 
whereby permanent immigration may increase, labour market shortages will be rife, 
remittances and skills transfers will be lost, and irregular immigration and in turn 
exploitation of migrant worker rights may be exacerbated. Whilst the policy design of 
SAWS was far from perfect, we argue that a modified version, targeting agricultural 
students, should be retained, which could restore the triple-win scenario.  
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Introduction  
The slogan that ‘there is nothing more permanent than temporary foreign workers’ has 
been a popular phrase to express the perceived failures of temporary migration 
programmes (TMPs). TMPs have a long and contentious history for Western nation-
states, where temporary labour evolved to permanent settlement, best encapsulated by 
the German experience of the guestworker system. What began as an expedient 
measure to fill temporary labour shortages in the early postwar period evolved into 
large-scale immigrant settlement, in turn transforming Germany into an ethnically 
diverse country of immigration (Ellerman 2015: 1236). Germany has since been 
‘haunted by the mistakes, failures and unforeseen consequences of the guest worker 
era’ (Freeman 1995: 890). Germany is hardly the exception to the unintended 
settlement of TMPs. The USA similarly faced feedback effects from the temporary 
bracero programme, as have other European states. Unsurprisingly then, Western states 
have been wary of operating TMPs during recent decades for fear of unintended 
settlement. 
Yet, as global labour market needs have evolved, and immigration regimes have 
become more mechanistic in their outputs, there has been some resurgence in TMPs 
and the advantages these programmes can bring. TMPs are back in fashion for a number 
reasons. Firstly, since the ‘global race for talent’ began in the late 1990s, there has been 
understandable concern over the impact of brain drain on sending countries. TMPs, and 
the model of return which is implicated, could possibly alleviate some forms of brain 
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drain. Secondly, established research has found that large-scale remittances, transferred 
by both high and less skilled immigrants, greatly improve the welfare of the persons 
left behind (Dustmann and Mestres 2010). Finally, and most pertinently for destination 
states, migrant workers on TMPs meet labour market demands but do not, or rather are 
not intended to, settle in the host state, thus appeasing public concerns over immigration 
whilst meeting employers’ demands (Martin 2008: 17).  
However, TMPs have been heavily, and rightly, criticised by both the academic 
and policy sectors, as they tie workers to employers in rigid ways (Hennebry 2012; 
Wickramasekara 2008), which can violate of migrant workers’ rights (Basok 2004; 
Castles 2006; Ruhs 2013; Nakache and Kinoshita 2010). In this way, TMPs have been 
criticised for creating ‘second-class citizenship’ (Lenard and Straehle 2012; Preibisch 
2010). Yet few studies have examined the lack of integration measures available on 
TMPs, and the effects such integration initiatives could have in the way of curbing the 
violation of migrant worker rights (Hennebry 2012; Lenard and Straehle 2012; 
Wickramasekara 2008).  
TMPs purportedly achieve the so-called ‘triple-win’ outcome in the following 
way: the host country can meet labour market demands whilst appeasing electoral 
concerns over permanent settlement; the sending country benefits from both 
remittances and skills transfer/brain gain from migrants acquiring skills in the 
destination state and transferring these skills on return; and the migrants themselves 
benefit by a mechanism which provides people from low-income countries with better 
access to labour markets in high-income states. Ultimately TMPs are pitched as the in-
between solution which satisfies both the ‘no borders’ and ‘no migrants’ arguments 
(Martin 2007; Ruhs and Martin 2008: 260). At a time where immigration is so salient, 
becoming a top three voting issue in the UK since the 2000s (Duffy 2014), appeasing 
both public concerns and employer demands is a requisite for governments. Thus the 
renaissance of TMPs is unsurprising.   
In contrast to the global trends towards utilizing TMPs to meet foreign labour 
demands, the UK government has now closed all temporary labour migration 
programmes. Whilst the cultural exchange Youth Mobility Scheme remains in place, 
both the Sector Based Scheme and long-standing Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
Scheme (SAWS) were terminated at the end of 2013. The ending of SAWS represents 
a turning-point in the UK’s immigration history, being both the first temporary 
programme to be established, but more significantly the longest-running migration 
programme – an unprecedented seventy years. It is thus a fitting time to reflect on the 
policy evolution of these schemes, and more importantly the impact and repercussions 
of their closure.1   
                                                        
1 This paper was originally prepared for the EU Framework 7 TEMPER programme for Work Package 
2 on seasonal work flows. The task was to provide a detailed report outlining the policies, programmes 
and demographic factors that drive seasonal work flows in the UK, in the period between 2000 and 2015. 
The country reports for France, UK, Spain and Italy culminated in a comparative inventory report by 
Work Package leader Dr Ana María López-Sala, see http://www.temperproject.eu  
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Based on desk research and interviews with stakeholders,2 we argue that in 
contrast to the triple win, by closing SAWS the government are inflicting a multiple 
loss, whereby permanent immigration may increase, labour market shortages will be 
rife, remittances and skills transfers will decrease, and irregular immigration and 
therefore exploitation of migrant worker rights may be exacerbated. Whilst the policy 
design of SAWS was far from perfect, we argue that a modified version which targets 
agricultural students and includes integration mechanisms would achieve a triple win, 
whilst also appeasing public concerns over permanent immigration.  
The paper is divided into three main sections. In the following section we 
provide a policy overview of the SAWS, discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the 
programme, and reflect on the reasons for closing the scheme. Secondly we discuss the 
impacts of the closure of SAWS on three domains: on the UK as the destination state; 
on the sending countries that previously participated; and on the migrants themselves. 
We deduce that the UK government has actually imposed a triple loss. We conclude 
the paper with policy recommendations. We recommend that a modified version of 
SAWS should have been retained, one akin to the pre-1990s student exchange model. 
This is in line with recommendations of the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC 
2013), the National Farmers Union (NFU 2012) and Scott (2015). 
 
Policy evolution and overview of the SAWS 
The SAW scheme was established in 1945 as a cultural exchange scheme to encourage 
young, predominantly agricultural, students from across Europe to work in agriculture 
in the peak seasons. The scheme emerged as a way of recruiting foreign nationals to fill 
labour market demands following the shortage of British manpower. The scheme had 
‘very strong roots in education, youth mobility’ (interview with NFU 2011), with 
students predominantly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union states 
dominating the scheme (Martin et al. 2006). However, over time the scheme evolved 
as a tool to meet labour demand in the agricultural sector more generally, crystallised 
by the previous Labour government’s reforms, which sought to frame immigration as 
part of a wider economic growth agenda (Consterdine 2014; Treasury 2000). Whilst in 
the 1990s the annual quota was set at 10,000 approximately, under the Labour 
governments the quota was increased by 15,000 places in total, rising to 15,200 in 2001 
and 25,000 in 2003, due to ‘shortages in the supply of seasonal and casual labour’ 
(Work Permits UK 2002). 
The SAWS was modified over the years, but it was in 1990 when the scheme 
became a quota-based system, beginning with an annual quota of 5,500 workers 
(Spencer et al. 2007). Before the closure of the scheme in 2013, SAWS had reached a 
                                                        
2 Interviews were conducted for each author’s respective doctoral research. Consterdine conducted 54 
interviews between 2011 and 2014 for the thesis titled Interests, Ideas and Institutions: Explaining 
Immigration Policy Change in Britain 1997-2010; Samuk conducted 53 interviews between September 
2013 and June 2015 for the thesis titled Temporary Migration and Temporary Integration: UK and 
Canada in a Comparative Perspective (see Consterdine 2014; Samuk’s thesis is ongoing). 
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quota of 21,250, a four-fold increase from the original 1990 quota (Table 1). The exact 
quota changed year-on-year according to the usage of the quota, labour market needs 
and the availability of European labour. The drop in in the 2004 quota for example was 
made on the assumption that migrants from the newly acceded EU member-states (A8) 
would fill any residual labour shortages. Ten per cent of the 345,000 workers 
registering in employment as accession country nationals between enlargement on 1 
May 2004 and 31 December 2005 registered with employers in agriculture or ﬁshing 
(Gilpin et al. 2006: 20). 
 
Table 1: SAWS work cards and quota used 
 
Year  SAWS work cards 
printed 
SAWS quota Percentage of 
SAWS quota used 
(%) 
2004 20,554 25,000 82 
2005 15,611 16,250 96 
2006 16,171 16,250 100 
2007 16,796 16,250 103 
2008 16,461 16,250 101 
2009 20,179 21,250 95 
2010 19,798 21,250 93 
2011 20,035 21,250 94 
2012 20,842 21,250 98 
Source: Home Office, taken from MAC Report (2013: 50).  
 
Data shows that it was first Russians and then Ukrainians, together with other 
non-EEA nationalities, which filled seasonal labour demands. However, over time 
these patterns have changed. According to the MAC (2013: 57), from 2004 to 2007 
most participants on the scheme (81-96 per cent) came from Eastern Europe and 
specifically from six source countries: Ukraine (33 per cent of Eastern European SAWS 
workers, 2004 to 2007), Bulgaria (23 per cent), Russia (15 per cent), Romania (11 per 
cent), Belarus (9 per cent) and Moldova (6 per cent). Scott et al. (2008) found that under 
the SAWS fewer than 30 per cent of the seasonal workers were from Bulgaria and 
Romania, around half of the workers were from A8 countries, and only one sixth of 
workers were from the UK.  
Whilst in 2004 the UK government did not initiate transitional measures on 
nationals of the A8 countries, thereby giving unfettered access to the UK labour market 
for these citizens, the UK government imposed full transitional controls (seven years) 
on Bulgaria and Romania following the 2007 accession. Thus, as a concession to the 
new accession states of Bulgaria and Romania (A2), the government stipulated that 
only A2 migrants could work on the SAWS from 2008. Forty per cent of the quota for 
SAWS was reserved for Bulgarians and Romanians in 2007 with the scheme then 
exclusively open for Romanians and Bulgarians from 2008, and ‘that’s why the student 
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restriction was taken off, which at the time the industry objected to a lot, because they 
wouldn’t be from an agricultural background but the sector has got used to that now 
and they just made their recruitment process more rigorous (NFU policy officer, 
interview 2011). Unsurprisingly then, in 2013 when the scheme was closed, it was 
Bulgarians and Romanians who had filled the majority of the quota.  
The time permitted on a SAWS visa was six months. After six months workers 
on the SAWS were allowed to stay in the country up to 12 months (Herefordshire 
Council 2014) but without the right to work. The MAC (2013) found that most 
Bulgarians returned to their homes after six months of work, suggesting effective 
circular migration. However, with transitional controls for A2 citizens lapsing in 2014, 
the return rate of A2 citizens is currently circumspect. Table 2 summarises these 
changes to the scheme over the years since 2000. 
 
Table 2: Changes to SAWS throughout the years  
Years Changes  
2000  Quota was 10,000 
2004 Quota increased to 25,000 
2004  A8 Accession 
2005  Quota decreased to 16,250 
2005 Introduction of fines for employees who 
are caught employing illegally residing 
immigrants  
2007 40 per cent of the quota allocated to A2 
2008 SAWS fully restricted to A2  
2007/2008  Labour shortages reported 
2008 The MAC recommended an increase in 
the quota from 16,250 to 21,250 
2009 The quota was increased to 21,250 with 





Different actors from both sending and receiving countries were involved in the 
operation of SAWS. Gangmasters in particular played an important role. In terms of 
implementation, one of the most important sets of actors were the operators, particularly 
in terms of liability, characteristic of the trend towards ‘outsourcing’ migration controls 
to private actors (Lahav 1998). Operators were responsible for recruiting and 
processing applications, ensuring that farmers provided suitable accommodation and 
adhere to regulations around work rights such as the minimum wage, and ultimately for 
the liability of those workers who had breached their visa terms and conditions 
(Simpson 2011: 11). Without operators’ permission, workers could not switch to 
another farm site. Hence operators formed the control mechanism for the lives of the 
workers. Nine operators 3  managed the SAWS on behalf of the UK Visas and 
Immigration Directorate (formerly known as the UK Border Agency). However, 
SAWS was, in the main, an industry-run scheme with only a ‘light touch’ from the 
Home Office in terms of enforcement: 
 
If they [Home Office] don’t like an operator, they’ll just mention it and the 
operator will get their standards in order and it was off the political radar. 
Because there would only be a six-month work permit to work in the UK it 
would never catch the attention of anybody − greatly appreciated by the 
industry. But it wasn’t controversial because there was no right to remain in the 
country (interview with NFU, 2011). 
 
A national catastrophe in 2004 served to highlight the potentially devastating 
effect of language barriers, and the potential exploitation of migrant workers, in turn 
prompting government action to better regulate the low-skilled sector.  This was the 
Morecambe Bay Cockling disaster, which resulted in the death of 23 Chinese workers. 
As a result the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA) was established on 1 April 
2005, with the primary purpose to prevent the exploitation of workers in the agricultural 
and food sector. The GLA is a non-departmental public body with a board of 30 
members from the industry, unions (including the umbrella Trade Union Congress) and 
government. The GLA’s purpose is to attempt to ensure that the employment standards 
required by law are met. However, it is not compulsory for the sole operators to sign 
up for the GLA. Only those registered are inspected by the GLA.  
The new law made it an offence to use labour provided by an unlicensed 
gangmaster. Thus gangmasters increasingly had to show they were not cutting corners, 
for example on wage payments or non-wage beneﬁts such as holiday pay, nor charging 
                                                        
3 These were Concordia (YSV) Ltd (8,125 work cards allocated 2013); HOPS Labour Solutions Ltd 
(8,100 work cards allocated 2013); Fruitful Jobs Ltd (620 work cards in 2013); Sastak Ltd (300 work 
cards allocated in 2013); S & A Produce (UK) Ltd (1,500 work cards issued in 2013); S & A Produce 
(UK) Ltd (1,500 work cards issued in 2013);  Barway Service Ltd (1,225 work cards issued in 2013); 
Haygrove Ltd (575 work cards issued in 2013); R & J M Place Ltd (525 work cards issued in 2013); 
Wilkin and Sons Ltd (280 work cards issued in 2013) 
 8 
excess fees for transport, or exorbitant rents on accommodation (Rogaly 2008: 503). 
GLA is a unique institution and has been heralded as a role model for other countries 
to prevent exploitation of agricultural labour (interview with GLA, 2014). Indeed the 
GLA is seen as an effective measure to ensure migrant workers’ rights, but is also met 
with support by employers: 
 
They [government] were always keen to penalise and look at immigration 
status, but they were very reluctant to extend the way in which workers’ rights 
could be enforced. The GLA was, I think, an aberration in a sense; I’m quite 
surprised it’s lasted as long as it has. Except of course the surviving businesses 
in the sector now see it as a protective measure, because it prevents them being 
undercut by less scrupulous or observant employers, so they were always quite 
keen that the government should take some responsibility on enforcing laws 
rather than them. So they quite like it funnily enough. Of course it’s not 
ostensibly about enforcing workers’ rights, it’s about ensuring that businesses 
are properly licensed. But nevertheless, I think in terms of behaviour, I think it 
has affected that sector (former TUC policy officer, interview 2011).  
Some 1201 labour providers had been licensed by the end of 2008, and during 
this period 78 licenses were revoked for breaches discovered during inspections, such 
as when a Suffolk gangmaster failed to pay statutory holiday pay, or when a Preston 
gangmaster failed to check on whether employees had the right to work in the UK 
(Sargeant and Tucker 2009: 14).  
A further set of actors involved in the recruitment and regulation of SAWS were 
the employers themselves, as their responsibilities were tied to the rights of migrant 
workers. Since the employer is supposed to provide work, accommodation and 
transport for a six-month period, the employees are arguably too dependent on the 
employers. While the GLA has enhanced the rights of seasonal migrant workers, it has 
been criticised for not doing enough to regulate the sector. Scott (2007: 1) for example, 
argues that these regulations have been more symbolic rather than ‘substantive 
rebalancing’.  Furthermore, the fact that on the SAWS it was almost impossible to 
change employer during a worker’s period of stay as part of the agreement, is outside 
the scope of the GLA’s enforcement remit. This aspect of dependence, a common 
feature of many TMPs and particularly agricultural TMPs, has been criticised across 
the policy sector, including Justice for Migrant Workers and by unions such as the 
United Food and Commercial Workers Union.  
 
Rights and exploitation  
Under the SAWS program, rights granted to SAWS workers were protected via 
different mechanisms. In this section, we examine the literature concerning rights of 
migrant workers de jure and de facto.  
Exploitation of temporary migrant workers comes in many forms, but what is 
perhaps distinct about agricultural TMPs is that the employers usually provide workers’ 
 9 
housing. Whilst this can be advantageous for workers, in many cases workers 
experience poor living conditions, as was the case on some SAWS sites. For example, 
Spencer et al. (2007: 43-44) found that, of the 82 agricultural workers they interviewed, 
17 per cent said that their accommodation was ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’. However, it was 
found that ‘the workers whose accommodation is entirely unregulated are particularly 
dissatisfied with it, suggesting some success in the regulation of accommodation 
provided to SAWS workers’ (Spencer et al. 2007: 44). One reason for the apparent poor 
living conditions of migrant agricultural workers is the assumption that, since the 
migrants themselves consider such work temporary, they are indifferent about their 
living conditions (Mayer 2005). Yet this creates further vulnerability. The isolated 
accommodation which migrant workers occupied meant that some SAWS workers 
found it harder to interact with British people and integrate, making workers ‘reliant on 
the company of other SAWS workers or some instances that of their employers or their 
families’ (Spencer et al. 2007: 61):  
Yet the poor living conditions many migrant workers experience is a peripheral 
issue in contrast to the exploitation that some experience at work. For example, of the 
gangmasters Scott (2007: 6-7) interviewed, only 6 per cent claimed that worker 
exploitation was not an issue in the agriculture sector, demonstrating the need for 
regulatory oversight. Martin Ruhs (2006: 24) attributes such exploitation to the 
institutional arrangements common in TMPs of tying the migrant worker to the 
employer, granting employers almost total control over the workers’ lives. Ultimately 
for the employer, the ideal worker is a temporary one given that, over time, migrant 
workers become more aware of their rights and are therefore more likely to make 
demands on their employers to enforce these (Spencer et al. 2007).  
Exploitation of migrant workers is also much more likely if people do not speak 
the native language. Spencer et al. (2007: 28) conducted research into how much 
migrant workers were informed of their rights before they came to the UK. They found 
that those who spoke English had more information and it was easier for them to access 
information compared to other groups that faced language barriers. Language therefore 
proves to be crucial in terms of preventing exploitation of migrant workers (see 
Preibisch and Otero 2014). It was also found that those who had the most difficulties in 
work were the ones who said that they did not receive any information about their job 
before or after their arrival (Spencer et al. 2007: 33), suggesting a pressing need for 
pre-training programmes to avoid exploitation (ILO 2014). Furthermore, because of the 
nature of work on SAWS in terms of time demands and shift work, such migrant 
workers are not necessarily able to take English courses and improve their language to 
integrate into their local community.  
These policies, which aim exclusively for temporary stays, are flawed if they 
do not provide adequate rights to the temporary migrant workers (Ruhs 2006), but states 
are often resistant to providing language courses in fear that they may encourage 
workers to stay longer and become permanent, as was the case on the SAWS (Interview 
with South East Strategic Partnership for Migration, 2015). The importance of language 
acquisition in terms of preventing exploitation suggests that some form of integration 
programme should be attached to TMPs. Yet in practice none of the current TMPs are 
 10 
designed in tandem with any kind of integration policy, and this negligence lies at the 
heart of the problems regarding rights and exploitation. 
 
Government closure of SAWS 
As the Conservative-led Coalition government entered office in 2010, one of the first 
orders of the day was to put measures in place to achieve the Conservative manifesto 
pledge of reducing net migration from the hundreds of thousands to the tens of 
thousands (Conservative Party 2010; HM Government 2010: 21). The principle behind 
such a target was to control immigration ‘so that people have confidence in the system’ 
and to ‘ensure cohesion and protect our public services’ (HM Government 2010: 21). 
A restrictive policy from the Conservatives was not unexpected, and in line with their 
ideological alignment (Bale 2008); nonetheless having a target in the first instance 
arguably represents the most explicitly restrictive policy to date.  
The policy reforms initially appeared to be somewhat effective at cutting 
immigration. Net migration had been falling, with levels at 153,000 in the year to 
September 2012, down from a peak of 255,000 in the year to September 2010. 
However, figures released in spring 2015, showed that net migration had reached 
330,000 (up 94,000 from year-end March 2014) (ONS 2015a), the highest net migration 
on record, and higher then when the Coalition entered office in 2010. In response, the 
government had to concede that they would not meet the pledge set out to reduce net 
migration by the end of the last Parliament in 2015. Despite this failure, the 
Conservative Party maintained their aspirational target for the current parliament 
(Conservative Party 2015).  
A major component of the Coalition’s policy, and indeed of the current 
Conservative government, is the need to make economic immigration an exclusively 
temporary phenomenon, or ‘break the link’, as epitomised by Theresa May in 2010: 
 
It is too easy, at the moment, to move from temporary residence to permanent 
settlement…Working in Britain for a short period should not give someone the 
right to settle in Britain…Settling in Britain should be a cherished right, not an 
automatic add on to a temporary way in (May 2010).  
 
This appears to be a ‘point of principle for the Conservatives’ (Cavanagh 2011), with 
Prime Minister Cameron stating in April 2011, ‘It cannot be right that people coming 
to fill short-term skills gaps can stay long term’ (Cameron 2011). According to the 
former UK Border Agency, the curtailing of settlement rights will ‘discourage over-
reliance on foreign workers’ (UKBA 2011: 1), yet past experience suggests otherwise. 
As Cavanagh  (2011: 4) puts it, ‘the more likely result is a shift to a constantly churning 
population of temporary working migrants – because although the need is permanent, 
the government is choosing for that need to be satisfied by people who stay only 
temporarily’.  
In the wider ambition to cut net migration drastically and break the link between 
temporary and permanent migration, the government then unsurprisingly closed both 
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the Sectors-Based Scheme and the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme in 
December 2013, to coincide with transitional controls lapsing for A2 citizens from 
Bulgaria and Romania in January 2014. Both the previous Coalition and current 
Conservative government are adamant that there should be no low-skilled migration 
labour routes, exemplified further by the fact that the low-skill Tier 3 of the points-
based system remains closed. The government’s justification for closing the scheme 
was, in the main, to eradicate any potential job displacement of the native workforce; 
thus the closure was made on the assumption that the EEA and particularly the British 
workforce would begin to fill these shortages. The stated reasons by former 
Immigration Minister Mark Harper for the closure was to prevent job displacement of 
British workers, and that EEA labour can adequately fill any remaining labour demands 
from employers (Harper 2013).  
 
Loss one: host state 
Whilst the government’s intention behind the closure of SAWS was ultimately to 
reduce net migration, end all low-skilled migrant channels, and purportedly increase 
employment amongst the native population, we argue that the cessation of the scheme 
is likely to have the adverse effects of increasing permanent migration, increasing 
irregular migration, and causing a shortage of labour in the agricultural sector. In 
contrast to the ‘win’ TMPs give the host state in terms of meeting labour market 
demands whilst appeasing public concerns over migration, the government’s decision 
to close the scheme effectively means the government ‘loses’, as labour demands will 
not be met but at the same time net migration is unlikely to decrease as a result, nor will 
be public concerns appeased. 
The British system of political economy has typically been regarded as a liberal 
market economy (Hall and Soskice 2001: 8). There is consequently a lack of 
coordinated wage bargaining arrangements, and firms primarily coordinate their 
activities via competitive market arrangements. As a result, there are incentives for 
employers to delay costly technological advancements in favour of depending on low-
wage labour (Menz 2008: 156). The flexibility, availability, often superior training and 
educational background, and ‘soft’ factors such as a stronger work ethic and 
commitment affiliated with migrant labour, have all meant that British employers on 
the whole embrace immigration. The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development 
(CIPD) have consistently highlighted that their members are more likely to consider 
hiring migrant workers than the ‘core jobless’, such as the over-50s and single parents 
(CIPD 2005: 3; TUC 2007: 12). Agricultural production is perhaps the sector that relies 
the most on importing foreign labour. 
Agricultural employers have long favoured foreign labour over the British 
workforce. Such preference is driven by a number of factors, but the overriding 
determinant is a superior work ethic and other soft skills (Ruhs 2006: 78). For example, 
in a survey of employers conducted by the National Farmers Union, one employer 
speculated that ‘UK workers do not seem to have an appropriate work ethic or attitude 
in our experience’ and another said that there was a ‘good response to the advert, but 
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the majority [of British workers] gave up within a week… SAWS made a huge 
difference and stabilised our workforce’ (NFU 2012: 7). In a Home Office study 
involving 124 interviews with employers across five sectors, only in agriculture did 
employers unequivocally see migrant workers as ‘crucial’ to their businesses (Dench et 
al. 2006, p.35). Consequently the sector has come to rely on foreign labour to fill labour 
market shortages (Rogaly 2008).  
However, whether such reliance can be said to constitute inevitable structural 
dependency is debatable. Anderson and Ruhs (2010) suggest that in many sectors 
increasing employer demand for migrant workers can be explained by a ‘systems effect’ 
that ‘produces’ certain types of labour market shortages. System effects arise from 
institutional and regulatory frameworks of the labour market and from wider public 
policies, such as welfare and social policies, which are not necessarily related to the 
labour market. Such forces are heavily influenced by the state and thus mostly reside 
outside the control of individual employers and workers. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that employers create such dependence, by offering poor working conditions 
which are unattractive to those with secure residency, i.e. the native workforce. Geddes 
and Scott (2009) argue that such reliance on migrant workers in the low-skilled sector 
− such as agriculture − is not inevitable but is rather ‘constructed’. Drawing on 
segmented labour market theory (Massey et al. 1998; Piore 1979), they claim that it is 
possible for firms to offset the costs of an uncertain market by ‘passing this uncertainty 
on to certain groups of workers’ (Geddes and Scott 2010: 198). This ‘temporary 
workforce constitutes the secondary labour market and it is here where the least 
desirable and most insecure forms of employment are concentrated’ (2010: 198). 
Rogaly (2008) likewise argues that, through mechanisms of intensification, agricultural 
employers have used vulnerability to ensure compliance in the labour force. 
Employers’ offering of poor working conditions then, at least partly, constructs 
the dependence on foreign labour in the agricultural sector. Nonetheless, without a 
costly, and thus unlikely, overhaul of employment practices and terms and conditions 
of agricultural labour to make it more attractive to workers, farmers and growers will 
face potentially detrimental labour market shortages as a result of the cessation of 
SAWS. Notably, the government chose to ignore its own independent body’s 
recommendation on the matter; the MAC (2013) concluded that whilst terminating the 
SBS would have no negative effects on the labour market, by contrast closing SAWS 
could be damaging in the long term for the agricultural sector. Such claims were made 
for several reasons, partly because the SBS was a much smaller scheme than SAWS 
and thus the closure would have less of an impact on the sector (MAC 2013: 18). 
Furthermore, there was evidence of misuse of the SBS, particularly leading to 
permanent migration of low-skilled workers (interview with representative of the 
British Hospitality Association 2012). The MAC recommended that a transitory 
alternative programme be put in place (MAC 2013: 4), a scheme also advanced by the 
NFU (NFU 2012). Suffice to say no such system has been established, and the sector 
has berated such inaction.  
Most agricultural employers claim it is too early to know the full impacts of 
closing SAWS, but that the repercussions are likely to be felt long-term (GLA 2014). 
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This is due to the labour supply from Bulgaria and Romania ‘not immediately drying 
up’ following the closure of SAWS, and due to contingency efforts put in place to ease 
the transition of the closure including making a limited number of work cards available. 
Many in the industry claim that whilst farms had an adequate workforce for 2014 and 
potentially in 2015, there will be a ‘workforce drought’ in 2016 (Chinn, Cobrey farms). 
For 2014 many employers had organised their workforce through agencies such as 
Concordia and HOPS, but by 2015 many stakeholders, including Andrew Colquhoun, 
chairman of the Farming and Rural Issues Group for the South East, claim ‘it is likely 
that Romanians and Bulgarians will move to other areas of the economy’.4 Whilst 
smaller businesses look to be unaffected by the closure of SAWS (GLA 2014: 10), 
business turnovers exceeding £1 million could face major shortages, and in turn 
describe the impact of the closure of SAWS as very negative. In a survey of labour 
users conducted by the National Farmers Union (NFU), over 95 per cent of growers 
who used SAWS in 2012 said that the removal of the scheme would have a negative 
impact on their business. Whilst since the cessation of the SAWS scheme, the number 
of British nationals employed (directly or via a labour provider) has indeed increased, 
this could be for a number of reasons including the need for workers was greater than 
the quota had allowed, higher turnover of workers and/or more workers available (GLA 
2014: 5). 
The sector has been very vocal in its opposition to the government’s decision to 
terminate SAWS, often deploying media-related strategies in their lobbying efforts and 
‘going public’ (Kollmann 1998). Meurig Raymond, deputy president of the NFU, said 
that their members were ‘outraged’ at the decision to close SAWS and that it 
‘completely contradicts David Cameron's belief that farmers are the backbone of 
Britain and the recommendations of the Migrant Advisory Committee that horticulture 
would suffer immeasurably without access to a reliable, flexible and consistent source 
of migrant seasonal workers’.5 The NFU have further claimed that the termination of 
SAWS will ‘cause a contraction in the British horticulture sector, one of which is 
already suffering from falling self-sufficiency levels. It will put thousands of existing 
permanent UK jobs at risk, stifle growth, compromise food security and jeopardize the 
industry’s efforts to take on hundreds more UK unemployed for permanent work’.6 
Likewise, the British Growers’ Association lambasted the government’s decision to 
ignore the MAC’s recommendation, claiming that the decision was ‘ill considered’, as 
the horticultural sector in the UK is a ‘high value sector’ in need of labour. Chief 
Executive of the British Growers Association (BGA) James Hallett has similarly 
accused the government of ignoring the advice of its own advisory committee to 
consider setting up a replacement scheme, claiming that the government’s decision 
could ‘have a significant and damaging impact on investment and production decisions 
affecting the UK with immediate effect’.7 
                                                        
4 http://www.fwi.co.uk/arable/farmers-fears-over-loss-of-seasonal-worker-scheme.htm  
5 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24064774  





Attracting resident workers 
Drastic shortages in the sector are likely to occur as a result of closing SAWS for two 
reasons. Firstly, employers predict that the British workforce will be unwilling and 
therefore unlikely to fill seasonal labour market shortages (MAC 2013). Part of the 
reason why agricultural employers prefer migrant labour, as mentioned above, is the 
perceived superior work ethic of migrants in contrast to British workers. As MacKenzie 
and Forde (2009: 150) show, the A8 workers were categorised as workers with a ‘strong 
work ethic’, and ‘great workers’ were amongst the phrases that are used by the 
employers at the time.  
Working conditions of agricultural workers have not changed in any substantial 
way since the closure of SAWS, thus attracting British workers to this type of work 
will remain challenging. Agricultural work is essentially a ‘3D’ job – dirty, dangerous 
and demeaning – typically dominated by foreign labour due to the undesirable working 
conditions. For example, in an NFU survey of employers 71 per cent claimed that there 
is very little interest to undertake seasonal agricultural work from the native workforce, 
basically because of the working conditions, in particular the long hours required. 
Agricultural work is physically demanding, low-paid, with long hours and is highly 
seasonal. This last feature in particular is a major dissuading factor for taking up 
agricultural work, as it provides no job stability, as Matt Ware, head of NFU 
Parliamentary Affairs, commented: 
 
The problem we’ve got, is that for British domestic workers, the benefits system 
works in a way that makes it unfavourable to work for a temporary period and 
when it comes to EU workers – they don’t want a seasonal job. They want a 
permanent job in a café or hotel in London, not six weeks on a farm.8 
 
The MAC concluded that it was unlikely that UK resident workers would make up a 
significant proportion of seasonal workers or replace SAW workers. They saw 
  
…no reason to expect a change in attitudes towards low-skilled manual work in 
horticulture from the resident labour force without a major drive to accomplish 
this…Growers also prefer to have workers living on the farms, readily available 
to work different shifts to satisfy immediate demands from suppliers and 
retailers, and this arrangement is generally unattractive for people already 
established elsewhere in the UK (MAC 2013: 159).  
British workers have evidently always been able to work in the agricultural 
sector, yet they make up less than 10 per cent of the agricultural labour force and it is 
worth noting that only nine farms in 2013 had any temporary/seasonal workers from 
the UK, dropping to eight in 2014 (GLA 2014: 6).  Whilst the Department for Work 
                                                        
8 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f610fb2-3e70-11e4-a620-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3fDeNwaVc  
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and Pensions has purportedly been working with JobCentre Plus, LANTRA (the sector 
skills council) and the NFU to help unemployed UK residents into horticultural work 
through training and guaranteed interviews (Harper 2013), these measures seem to have 
had little impact. Farm Minister George Eustice controversially suggested at a NFU 
conference in February 2014 that UK benefit claimants should be sent to work on farms 
to fill any vacancies, stating that:  
I know that some people will say ‘you won’t get them (UK unemployed) to do 
this work, they don’t want to do it’, but as a government, we shouldn’t really 
tolerate that attitude that says, ‘we’re going to pay people to stay on benefits 
because they don’t want to do certain types of farm work’. We need to get across 
and overcome this attitude where we say, ‘it’s OK to pay people benefits and 
accept that they are not going to take jobs that are on offer’.9 
Eustice added that the government was working on getting more local people to take 
jobs on farms, which would be ‘factored in’ to the work the DWP was doing on 
allocating benefits. Yet the seasonal and temporary nature of agricultural work means 
that there are administrative hurdles and little incentive for unemployed claimants to 
return to work for a short period and then, at the end of their seasonal contract, have to 
look for further work and potentially reapply for welfare assistance; a process which 
the DWP recognises does not always support smooth transitions from receipt of out-of-
work benefits into seasonal work (MAC 2013: 160). As a former TUC policy officer 
observed, 
Agency working is kind of a high-risk strategy − if you’re living here because 
it’s too insecure for you to have rent to pay/mortgage to pay − the benefits 
system doesn’t respond very well to ‘I work two weeks, then I didn’t work for 
ten days, then three days’. Whereas if the actual reproduction of labour costs 
were carried out like Romanian or Polish somewhere with a much lower cost of 
living, then you’d say ‘Well I’m here, I’m contingent, I’m here for nine months, 
I share a room with four other people at that time – it’s feasible’ (interview 
2011). 
Essentially employers claim that the benefits system is not flexible enough to 
accommodate this and such concerns have been echoed across the sector, particularly 
amongst growers. Whilst such assumptions concerning welfare claimants are perhaps 
unfounded, there is little incentive for settled workers to relocate for temporary work, 
especially for workers with families where relocating temporarily and for insecure 
employment would potentially have high material and social costs. This is compounded 
by the urban/rural disconnect, where the majority of unemployed British workers are 
located in urban areas, whereas agricultural work is necessarily rural, best represented 
by Herefordshire, the region which recruits the most foreign workers on SAWS. In the 




MAC’s consultation regarding the impact of ending SAWS, Herefordshire Council’s 
response was that:  
 
Although unemployment has increased during the recession the unemployment 
rate in Herefordshire remains to be low both nationally and regionally. In 
October 2012, there were 2671 Jobseekers Allowance claimants living in the 
county. Even if all of these claimants were to take on seasonal work for growers 
they wouldn’t provide the level of labour that the country’s growers need each 
season (MAC 2013: 6). 
 
Retaining A2 workers 
The second factor which is predicted to cause drastic shortages in the agricultural sector 
is that employers believe that Romanian and Bulgarian workers, now unrestrained in 
their employment opportunities in the UK, will move to other sectors with more 
favourable and stable working conditions. Many farmers have concerns that this once-
reliable labour pool will be drawn to other areas of the economy, particularly 
employment in urban areas, where working conditions are better and they can earn 
higher wages. Half of employers interviewed by the NFU claim that Bulgarians and 
Romanians will unlikely meet labour demands (NFU 2012: 5). This is not a groundless 
assumption; employers had already experienced such transitions with A8 migrants at 
the time of the 2004 accession: 
 
I think the other issue of it was the discovery that in fact this was not a stream 
of low-skilled migrants that were coming into the country. They were actually 
highly qualified and their ambitions were to move out as quickly as possible, 
out of the low-skilled entry jobs that they had come into. They needed jobs 
quickly, and the ones that are available to them are picking asparagus off the 
local farms, they did that at home, so they could do that rapidly. But once they 
started building up their networks and their English started improving, then they 
started wondering exactly what they could do (Migrant Rights Network 
interview, 2011).  
 
At the time of writing (July 2015) it is not known how many A2 nationals are working 
in the agricultural sector, but with better working conditions elsewhere there seems to 
be little doubt that they will move to other parts of the labour market in the forthcoming 
years. Essentially the government have played the ‘numbers game’, assuming that 
British and A2 labour will continue to fill shortages, yet as a Unison representative 
commented: ‘I think this at the heart of the problem of the migration debate − we’re 
always looking at numbers rather than at people’ (Unison interview 2011). 
In terms of labour market impact on the agricultural sector, the likely outcome 
will be higher turnovers, prompting higher recruitment, training and administration 
costs and potentially slower production, in turn pushing up famers’ labour costs and 
reducing competitiveness. As a Worcestershire hop and apple grower commented:  
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The size of the labour pool at any one time will not change, but more people 
will be coming and going and I imagine we’ll be dealing with a bigger number 
of individuals, more regularly… The biggest thing that will happen is we’ll be 
recruiting more people for the same number of jobs this year…. Eastern 
European migrants will come into our industry. They will come over to do our 
jobs, but they will quickly realise they can leave agriculture and find work in 
urban areas (Ali Capper quoted in Farmers Weekly10). 
 
Indeed, Andrew Colquhoun, chairman of the Farming and Rural Issues Group for the 
South East argued that, by closing SAWS, 
 
Farmers and growers will see their margins cut even further after a couple of 
years of bad weather, or the supermarkets will return to suppliers outside the 
UK, which affects the viability of what British farmers are doing.11 
In a GLA report on the impacts of closure of the scheme, a number of farmers expressed 
‘concern about their continued ability to meet customer demand and indicated that this 
was likely to result in additional wasted crops and loss of profit and increased cost to 
the consumer. This may in time result in businesses going under, as they would be 
unable to fulfil contracts’ (GLA 2014: 30). 
Furthermore, as traditionally many workers on SAWS exercised circular 
migration – returning home at the end of the season and returning to farms the following 
year – very little training was required for returnees and their earning capacity was 
enhanced by previous experience. As an NFU policy officer commented: 
  
They’re young so they don’t tend to clutter up surgeries and prior to 2007 they 
tended to be recruited from agricultural students, so the industry will benefit as 
they already have some knowledge of the industry and they’ll have suitable 
expectations of work (interview 2011). 
 
Although the termination of SAWS has brought some benefits to employers − such as 
no longer having to pay SAWS fees to operators, and no restrictions on length of time 
workers could remain working − such advantages were nonetheless offset by the 
incurrence of extra costs due to increased turnover of less experienced staff requiring 
training, ‘resulting in slower production whilst trying to meet the ever increasing 
demands of retail customers’ (GLA 2014: 30). 
 
 
                                                        
10 http://www.fwi.co.uk/arable/farmers-fears-over-loss-of-seasonal-worker-scheme.htm  
11 http://www.fwi.co.uk/arable/farmers-fears-over-loss-of-seasonal-worker-scheme.htm  
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Community cohesion 
The cessation of SAWS could also potentially incur fiscal costs to public services. One 
of the advantages of using SAWS was that ‘the operators of farms provide a holistic 
package of support for the individual workers which minimises the support needed from 
public services, for instance language and translation support’ (MAC 2013: 7). Some 
agricultural employers had previously introduced initiatives to ensure a positive 
integration of workers, both within the company and the community as a whole, 
including providing free English as Overseas Language (ESOL) training (Dench et al. 
2006: 18). With the closure of the comprehensive SAWS package, translation costs to 
public services in concentrated agricultural regions may increase. 
Relatedly, because SAWS provided a controlled working period so that workers 
had to return to their country of origin at the end of the season, employers have put 
forward concerns that community cohesion could worsen in areas where agricultural 
work is concentrated. The SAWS scheme was an effective TMP precisely because it 
was designed for agricultural students, thus workers has a clear incentive to return: 
 
They [SAWS workers] were usually students but not in their final year of study, 
with the advantage of that being that they’d have a very low absconding rate, 
i.e. they wouldn’t disappear into the undergrowth because they had a good 
reason to go back to their country of origin (NFU policy officer, interview 
2011).  
 
The concern now is that workers may be reluctant to return home at the end of a season 
‘which could result in community impact issues involving alcohol abuse and 
homelessness resulting in community tension over the winter period’ (GLA 2014: 30). 
Community cohesion tensions have increased in areas where agricultural migrant 
workers have dominated, such as Boston and Lincolnshire (interview with NFU 2011), 
yet because employers provided accommodation as part of the SAWS package, 
community cohesion problems were somewhat dampened (interview with NFU 2011). 
Such impacts will do little to appease already growing public concerns over 
immigration, particularly in light of the fact that those who reside in rural areas are, all 
else being equal, more in favour of restrictive migration policies in contrast to those 
who reside in urban areas (OECD 2010: 133).  
Indeed, the government’s overall intent behind closing SAWS was to reduce net 
migration to appease growing public concerns over immigration. Yet the closure of 
SAWS has done nothing in the way of reducing net migration, and conversely 
immigration from Bulgaria and Romania since transitional controls lapsed has 
increased, although not substantially. The latest estimates of long-term migration from 
the International Passenger Survey are for the year ending December 2014, when an 
estimated 46,000 Bulgarian and Romanian citizens immigrated to the UK. This is a 
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statistically significant increase from 23,000 for the year ending December 2013.12 The 
estimates for the year ending December 2014 show that there has been an increase in 
immigration of A2 citizens to the UK, predominately for work. However, this increase 
began in 2013, before the lifting of restrictions, and appears to have continued into 2014 
(ONS 2015b). As an NFU respondent suggested: 
 
Ending SAWS effectively meant this pool of 21,250 jobs was opened up to non-
British citizens, with no requirements for these workers to return to their home 
countries. So we believe that ending SAWS would actually have the effect of 
adding a potential 21,250 people to the net immigration figures.13 
 
Whilst the government did not claim that ending SAWS would reduce 
immigration from A2 countries, and evidently the settlement of A2 citizens is out of 
the government’s control, the overriding theme of both the Coalition and current 
Conservative governments’ policy has been to restrict migration by closing and 
curtailing all migration routes for migrants coming from outside the EU/EEA. The 
termination of SAWS has not had the desired effect in this respect. 
 
Irregular migration, exploitation and the mechanisation of agricultural sector 
Perhaps the most alarming potential repercussion of closing SAWS from the 
government’s perspective will be a likely increase in irregular migration in the 
agricultural sector, a sector already long criticised for exploitation and poor working 
conditions. As a Unison interviewee commented: 
 
The other solution is that they stay below the surface and are subject to 
exploitation, and that’s not in their interests and it’s not in the interests of other 
workers because it leads to employers taking on people to exploit them and it 
leads to undercutting (Unison interview 2011). 
This is far from being certain, yet if farmers and growers cannot source their labour 
through legitimate channels such as SAWS, they may ‘fall foul of unscrupulous 
individuals who may commit more serious offences involving illegal labour supply or 
other potentially more serious criminal offences, for example trafficking or forced 
labour of the workforce being supplied’ (GLA 2014: 30). Indeed amongst employers 
whom the GLA interviewed in regards to closing SAWS, ‘a number of those… have 
noticed an increase in the “too good to be true” offers made by individuals seeking to 
supply them with infinite numbers of workers’ (GLA 2014: 30). The GLA also found 
that additional workers required by farmers or growers were now being sourced through 
current workers and this presents further risk, as the opportunity is there for 
unscrupulous and potentially illegal gangmasters to operate within this area and exploit 
                                                        
12 The International Passenger Survey, which only samples a small fraction of those entering the UK, 
is, however, not an accurate method to enumerate the migration of individual nationalities. 
13 Email correspondence with NFU.  
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the workforce (GLA 2014: 31). If this did occur, it would have wider consequences for 
the industry, as ‘the last thing a supermarket wants is a headline you know “big 
supermarket caught with illegal immigrants”. The supermarket would drop that supplier 
immediately’ (NFU policy officer, interview 2011). If such a situation does or has 
occurred, the closing of the scheme has only worsened irregular migration, an area 
where the Conservative government have focused much of their enforcement efforts to 
eradicate.   
Yet perhaps the most damaging and likely implication of terminating SAWS in 
the long run, and the one which goes completely counter to the government’s intention 
to fill shortages with British labour, is the further mechanisation of production to reduce 
the need for labour (NFU 2012: 5; MAC 2013: 173). In other words, growers reduce 
labour requirements by increasing the input of capital such as investing in technology 
which can either replace labour or make labour more efficient. Such moves to 
mechanisation have included table-top technology to improve efficiency of the picking 
process; in salads and brassicas picking rigs have enabled crops to be picked, washed, 
processed, packaged, labelled and carted in the field; and in top fruit and stoned fruit 
new dwarf varieties of trees have been developed which have greatly eased picking. 
Whilst such technological developments are a long-term solution and cannot replace 
current labour-intensive demands, if employers do face detrimental labour shortages, 
the mechanisation of agricultural production may be the inevitable solution. Such 
developments would go counter to the government’s intention behind closing the 
scheme: to recruit more British workers.   
The government have self-imposed a loss by closing SAWS, particularly in 
terms of not meeting labour shortages in a sector dependent on a flexible labour pool. 
Whilst such dependence is without question constructed by employers in the sense that 
the working conditions offered are poor in comparison to other sectors, with tight profit 
margins and increasing product demand, there is little hope for overhauling working 
practices in the sector. For the government such labour market losses might be offset if 
ending SAWS decreased net migration, increased resident employment and appeased 
public concerns. Yet the cessation of SAWS does not fulfil any of these ambitions, and 
may in fact increase irregular migration causing both an increase in exploitation of 
workers, and swelling an underground labour pool, something the Conservative 
government have, at least rhetorically, sought to tackle. The lack of a comprehensive 
package for migrant workers, which SAWS had provided, may also cause a slight fiscal 
increase in costs to public services, and worsen community cohesion in geographical 
areas that are dominated by agricultural workers. Terminating SAWS is an ‘own goal’ 
for the UK in this respect, and represents the first loss in what had previously been a 
triple win.  
 
Loss two: sending states  
Sending states benefit from their migrant workers and temporary migration policies in 
various ways. The most important of these benefits are those concerning remittances 
and skill transfers.  
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Ruhs (2006: 17) argues that the return of immigrants can influence the home 
society positively in two ways. Firstly, migrant workers transfer skills between states, 
which are made possible by the return mechanism in place. Secondly, development can 
occur through businesses or entrepreneurship that are opened with the capital of the 
returnees. Although generally the high-skilled migrant workers are assumed to 
contribute more with skills transfers to their home countries in contrast to low- or mid-
skilled workers (Iredale 2001), such transfers are also relevant for low-skilled 
temporary jobs. For example, Balaz and Williams (2004) found that, in the case of 
Slovakian return migrants who had stayed temporarily in the UK, the level of human 
capital transfer was high.  
In terms of the transfer of skills, SAWS was considered a successful scheme; 
according to the NFU ‘it was a way of providing them with vocational experience in 
another country. So it was a very well-balanced scheme − a lot of benefits and very 
easy to manage’ (interview with NFU 2011). As a GLA officer stated in an interview, 
agricultural work was used as a ‘stepping-stone’ for many migrant workers and those 
who had gained the skills could go back and use them in their countries:  
 
Because agriculture was much seen as a stepping-stone for workers with some 
skills and intelligence to get away from the very basic level of work into 
something better. So the Polish economy, which I think had 40 per cent 
unemployment when they came, improved, so anybody who has got skills and 
ability to be mobile, went back. Not everybody did, large populations in 
communities of Poles were established and created. But some of them went 
back with certain skills; others not because people who are already in the 
country would use the agricultural work as a stepping stone; the better able 
workers have left (interview with Darryl Dixon, Director of Strategy at GLA, 
2015). 
 
Besides skills transfers, remittances are the major contributory factor which 
TMPs are said to bring to sending states. Whilst remittances are an important source of 
development for sending states from all types of mobility, temporary migration has 
been found to bring even greater remittances than more permanent migration, precisely 
because migrant workers intend to return, and thus have high incentives for investing 
in their country of origin (Dustmann and Mestres 2010). Both the migrant workers’ 
families and the sending states can benefit from remittances, which can make a 
significant contribution to gross domestic product (GDP). Temporary emigration is also 
desired in comparison with permanent emigration by the sending states because those 
who migrate permanently decrease their remittances over time (Dustmann and Mestres 
2010).  
A number of studies have found positive advantages of TMPs for sending states. 
Markova (2010) for example found that Bulgarian returnees from TMPs contributed 
positively to the Bulgarian economy through an increase of small businesses made 
possible through remittances. Lucas (2005) argues that consumption in sending states 
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is increased via temporary migrant workers’ families, which has revived some local 
economies.  
For some sending states, the remittances acquired from temporary migrant 
workers provide a main source of income. As one interviewee explained: 
  
 The Moldovans as well were sort of saying: we’re being shut out. We do what 
we can to keep Moldovan workers coming to the UK because it’s the central 
income for them – UK wages are 20 to 40 times higher than theirs. So if you’ve 
got someone who’s a second year student if they could spend six months in the 
UK then that would fund their studies, so they benefited a lot from that (NFU 
policy officer, interview 2011). 
 
Skill transfers acquired are clearly beneficial for both the migrant themselves and their 
country of origin, but furthermore the return clause inherent in TMPs acts as a 
prevention of brain drain, as the intention is for the worker to return home.   
 
Loss three: migrant rights 
One of the most important losses is that of the rights of the migrant workers. The debate 
on temporary migrant rights has resulted in three different critical positions. Ruhs 
(2013) argues that there is a trade-off between rights and numbers, while Mayer (2005) 
has suggested that some exploitation could be acceptable if the migrant workers are 
also benefiting from the schemes. In contrast to these perspectives, Lenard and Straehle 
(2012) argue that there is no need to eliminate the programmes or decrease the numbers 
but it is possible to improve them by giving the opportunity to migrant workers to have 
more rights gradually and have a route to permanent residency. Closing the SAWS 
undermined all three of these perspectives. Yet terminating SAWS does little to 
improve rights or reduce numbers and could lead to deterioration in the rights of 
seasonal agricultural workers.  
International conventions have had limited effects on the protection of the rights 
of temporary migrant workers (Ruhs 2011), despite efforts to enforce standardised 
practices. The most prominent conventions to protect the rights of migrant workers are 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions 43 and 97 and the 1990 UN 
Convention.14 Besides these, the 2005 adoption of the ILO Multilateral Framework on 
Labour Migration offers guidelines on labour migration policies while stressing 
cooperation between the sending and receiving countries, employers and also the 
migrant workers (Martin 2006: 53-54). At the domestic level, in the UK,  
 
the right to work provides the conceptual basis for a number of labour market 
principles which workers in Britain would expect to be applicable to them as a 
matter of course – including the possibility to resign, the freedom to change 
                                                        
14 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/cmw.htm accessed 31 July 2015.  
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employer, the freedom to take a second job, and the possibility to move to the 
other parts of the UK for the purposes of employment (Ryan 2005: 25).  
 
However, Ruhs (2011) draws attention to the rights granted at the international level to 
the migrant workers, and how the reinforcement of these rights is neglected at the 
domestic level in many nation-states. For instance, most of the SAWS workers cannot 
benefit from these rights if they are tied to one employer. This conditionality makes it 
impossible for them to move and search for jobs in other places. Hence, this restriction 
could lead to staying in the same workplace even if exploitation occurs.   
Whilst being a successful programme overall, the SAWS had limitations in 
relation to the lack of an integration scheme for the migrant workers. Nonetheless, 
closing the programme could be more damaging, since an under-regulated area might 
become wholly unregulated, and this could have a negative effect on both employers 
and employees. Coupled with deregulation in the labour market, and not being obliged 
to abide by international conventions, the rights of migrant workers could be further at 
risk. From an economic liberal perspective, closing the programme could also prevent 
competition amongst the operators to acquit SAWS work cards. If there is no 
competition to qualify for attaining SAWS work cards, the operators may well lower 
their standards.  
Additionally, gangmasters might control the labour market more as recruiters, 
which might exacerbate the violation of rights of those migrants who do not speak the 
language or who are not aware of their rights in the UK. Therefore, having a programme 
such as SAWS is better than not having one at all (Scott 2015), since SAWS had 
provided the channels for legal entry and stay as well as checks and controls on the 
employers and in the workplace. 
The lack of a holistic package for the migrant workers as a result of closing 
SAWS could mean that employers will assume less responsibility. One reason for this 
is the accommodation clause, which used to be provided by the employers.  The 
accommodation of the migrants and their registration will now have to be ascertained 
by the workers themselves. Although this scenario is not unreasonable, this situation 
might generate further problems for the sustainability of the agricultural sector, as there 
might be delays in applications and issues finding accommodation for the migrant 
workers. If the local context is not suitable for these arrangements the rents for the 
migrant workers might get higher, causing further problems such as disadvantaged 
living conditions. In this case, they might end up staying again in overcrowded houses 
with a lack of basic utilities. If the employers were not responsible for accommodation 
this would also mean that the GLA would not have to check the premises of the 
employers where the migrant workers are staying. This could be one complication 
which would surface as a result of the closure of these programmes. As an NFU policy 
officer commented: 
 
They can be mis-sold, they can be extorted in their country of origin and 
likewise when they come to their new host country, they don’t know their 
way around, they don’t know the employment laws, so they are a vulnerable 
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group. The SAWS operator will be on the ground in the country they’re 
recruiting from, this year for recruitment for the next seasons.. They spend 
about three years getting them up to speed because they only want people 
who apply high standards, which is partly why SAWS has been such an 
uncontroversial scheme, because the operators control their local agents in 
the country of origin very carefully and scrupulously, but a lot of the 
recruitment going on in the A8 countries for example have probably been 
mis-sold or such like (NFU policy officer, interview 2011).  
 
The closure of the SAWS could mean that the migrants who used to come on 
the basis of SAWS, in which certain standards were guaranteed, will be arriving and 
working on a more informal basis. There is a possibility that there might be more 
reliance on gangmasters, as it had been before the programme was established. This 
would mean that more informal employment and recruitment could take place. On the 
other hand, if the Bulgarians and Romanians do take more permanent jobs in other 
sectors, the labour to fulfill the labour market shortages would be met by the non-EEA 
countries, which could cause irregular migration patterns leading to a number of 
undocumented migrant workers who are more vulnerable. All these possibilities are not 
necessarily short-term consequences but may be medium to long-term implications.   
 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have argued that the UK government has imposed a triple loss by 
closing the SAWS in 2013, as the country will face labour market shortages, skills 
transfers could be lost between states, and migrants working in the UK agricultural 
sector could see violations of rights exacerbated, as the sector is able to operate with 
less regulation in many ways. As a result, we argue, in concurrence with the MAC 
(2013), the NFU (2012) and Scott (2015), that a modified version of SAWS be retained, 
one more akin to the pre-1990s programme where the scheme focused on recruiting 
students. However, we advocate that a new scheme must have new safeguards put in 
place, particularly in the way of introducing integration measures, which could alleviate 
potential exploitation. In the concluding part of the paper, we describe our policy 
recommendations and justification for such recommendations.    
 
Recruitment practice and institutional arrangements 
Whilst the SAWS programme has been championed as a relatively successful TMP, we 
suggest that a modified scheme could instead take the form of a bilateral agreement 
between the UK and particular sending countries. Alternatively, a modified agricultural 
programme could be incorporated as part of a Tier 5 Government Authorised Exchange 
Scheme, which would, like a bilateral agreement, ensure joint liability of the return of 
migrant workers between both host and sending state.  
We recommend that the maintenance of the seasonal agricultural scheme should 
be reverted back to the pre-1990s SAWS, when the scheme was only open for 
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agricultural students. The modified scheme we propose should be less of a labour 
facilitator, and more a student exchange scheme, which focuses on the transfer of skills 
between states in this sector, whilst at the same time filling labour market shortages. In 
other words, the scheme should essentially be a student exchange scheme with the by-
product of filling shortages.  
In terms of sending countries to recruit from, much like Scott (2015), we 
propose that either all EU candidate countries be admitted, or exclusively Moldova and 
Ukraine. Such agreements with candidate countries would serve a diplomatic purpose 
to build allegiances with these countries, but we argue Moldova and Ukraine should 
have privileged access to the scheme because these countries have a dominant 
agricultural sector, making up 12 per cent (Rotaru 2015) and 8 per cent (OSW 2007) of 
total GDP respectively. Such a large sector means that the UK can surely only gain 
from the skills and knowledge of agricultural workers from these countries.  
Whilst the UK has rarely engaged with bilateral agreements as a way to 
facilitate immigrant labour, such schemes are one of the main recruitment procedures 
for low to medium skilled labour in France, Italy and Spain. Bilateral agreements are 
problematic for a myriad of reasons, but we nonetheless believe that by recruiting and 
regulating agricultural labour through such an agreement, the fear of settlement of 
workers − which is one of the sources for the UK government’s anxiety (as well as 
public opinion in the UK) and thus closure of SAWS − will be alleviated, as the sending 
country will have a liability to ensure of the return of their citizens. By creating mutual 
liability, with the UK ensuring that the rights of workers are protected, whilst the 
sending country ensures their return, we maintain that a temporary agricultural 
agreement could be sustainable and preferable to cessation of SAWS.  
At the heart of this agreement is the need for a reciprocal clause so that UK 
students participating in agriculture-related degrees would likewise have the 
opportunity to stay and work in participating countries. This will bring the key win of 
two-way skills transfers to the fore of the programme, a process that resolutely 
contributes to the triple-win scenario. A reciprocal agreement like this could be 
modelled on the Youth Mobility Scheme, where for countries to participate they must 
demonstrate that they have effective return arrangements in place. This means that the 
UK government must be satisfied that there is an effective means of enforced return, 
which requires the sending state to accept EU letters for the purpose of returns (or 
national passports or emergency travel documents); the sending state must also re-
document their nationals swiftly at a level commensurate with demands, and receive 
their nationals in a timely and appropriate manner. As a reciprocal agreement the UK 
would in turn adhere to this arrangement by ensuring the return of UK citizens. In this 
way, ensuring return will be a joint liability, allowing for greater state oversight and 
making the scheme strictly temporary and hence more palpable for government policy 
to appease public concerns.  
To prevent the violation of agricultural workers’ rights, we submit that the GLA 
and UK Visas and Immigration need to conduct more regular inspections of the 
accommodation and working conditions of workers on sites, and that the GLA, in 
conjunction with HM Revenues and Customs, needs to enforce the minimum wage 
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much more effectively. Evidently the need to enforce the minimum wage is a much 
wider problem that is not exclusive to the agricultural sector or indeed migrant workers 
generally. Nonetheless, without effective oversight and regulation, of which the GLA 
has been successful within its confined remit, the protection of migrant workers’ rights 
will be unattainable.  
 
Rights: integration mechanisms  
Since TMPs often contain terms and conditions that are conducive to exploitative 
circumstances, there is a need to ensure the rights of the migrant workers during their 
stay. We argue that the migrant workers can be integrated temporarily and that this 
temporary integration should consist of policies such as providing language courses at 
(at the very least) A1 level on the Common European Framework of Reference for 
Languages (CEFR). We suggest that employers, in conjunction with operators and the 
educational institutions in which the students are registered, can jointly meet the 
funding of these courses. As a large amount of research shows (Spencer et al. 2007), 
learning even the basics of the host language can mitigate and prevent some of the worst 
exploitation that agricultural migrants face. These courses would provide the migrant 
workers with the necessary tools to integrate within the period they are staying and 
working. In other words, this would provide a level of social and cultural integration, 
given that the impacts of immigration flows are mostly observed at the local level. 
Another proposition of such integration could be to raise awareness in the localities so 
that the people are informed about the migration patterns, migrants, programmes and 
their specific contribution to the local economy. These kinds of activities and efforts 
would enhance community cohesion while at the same time providing a shield against 
exploitation of migrant workers.  
We also suggest that a pre-departure orientation package be set-up for migrant 
workers as part of a modified scheme. Whilst the UK has, to the best of our knowledge, 
never initiated a formal pre-training programme, these exist as part of bilateral 
agreements in numerous states, including the agricultural scheme in the USA. Recently 
the Canadian government has also put in place an on-arrival orientation programme for 
temporary Mexican workers (in their own language and in English), which outlines 
their rights and responsibilities at the ports of entry. Such pre-orientation programmes 
have been very successful at integrating migrants in many states, reducing community 
cohesion problems. Consequently, the advocacy sector, including the ILO (2014), has 
pressed for such measures to be standard practice. 
With regards to these packages, both the sending and the receiving states should 
take some of the responsibility, in consultation with trade unions. Hence, the financial 
responsibility could be divided between the sending and the receiving states, which are 
two of the beneficiaries in the triple-win scenario. These pre-departure orientation 
programmes could include: being advised on working conditions, what migrants are 
expected to do regarding their work (limits and contents of their tasks), what their 
labour rights are in the host state, instructing them about the conditions on return, 
including any incentives to return that are proposed by the sending state (in case that 
 27 
the sending state prevents these incentives). We see no reason why a similar package 
cannot be provided either before workers/students arrive or as soon as they arrive.  This 
is not only a practical but also an ethical consideration on the side of the states, policy-
makers and the employers. Table 3 provides a summary of our policy 
recommendations. 
 
Table 3 Summary of policy recommendations: 
 
 Exclusively agricultural students  
 A bilateral agreement or new scheme under Tier 5 Government Authorised 
Exchange 
 A reciprocal clause enhancing two-way skills transfers 
 Return as condition of visa; sending states now liable for citizens’ return and 
could be black-listed if non-return rate was high 
 No change to time limits; quotas dependent on labour market needs and 
political feasibility; EU candidate countries or specifically Moldova and 
Ukraine 
 Integration measures: language classes funded by some combination of 
educational institutions of agricultural students, operators, and employers 




Appendix: List of Interviews 
Deputy Chief Executive of the British Hospitality Association (15/11/12) 
 
Don Flynn, Director Migrant Rights Network; former policy officer for Joint Council 
for the Welfare of Immigrants (20/07/11 and 11/6/2014) 
 
Senior Legal Adviser at National Farmers Union (22/11/11) 
 
Employment Relations Senior Research Fellow, Working Lives Research Institute; 
formerly TUC (project manager for establishing European workers council and board 
for GLA) (04/08/11) 
 
Head of Strategic Organising for UNISON; National Development Manager for 
Migrant and Vulnerable Workers 2008-2011 (07/7/11) 
 
UKVI Regional Manager (1/07/15) 
 
Rosa Crawford, TUC Policy Officer, TUC (12/6/2014) 
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Roy Millard, Southeast England Councils (5/4/2015) 
 
Darryl Dixon, Director of Strategy, GLA (4/3/2015) 
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